Korea is widely recognized as a paragon of miraculous economic development as well as rapid advancement of democracy, and yet most researchers in Korea point to the lack of political leadership and immaturity of civil society as dominant factors inhibiting advancement of democracy. Considering the lack of experiences in selfgovernance by grassroots Korean people, where such experience is only recently (since 1988 at most) beginning to accumulate, such a claim may mislead the true nature of the obstacles in advancement of democracy as the Korean society as a whole face today: it may imply that the institutional context of Korean society has little effect on deterrence of democracy.
I. Introduction
For the past half-century, Korea has established itself as an outstanding example of economic development. Such rapid economic growth was possible mostly due to the strategic planning and a series of daring and critical investment decisions by the central government. However, the seemingly successful economic development strategy had a number of undesirable consequences, such as the political sacrifice of average citizens not being able to fully exercise their right to make public decisions for themselves.
The fundamental principle of a democracy is that average citizens have the right to decide public matters through political processes of collective decision-making. In a representative democracy, citizens delegate the power to make public decisions to a number of representatives through an election process, and the explicit rule for such collective decision-making process is accepting the majority decision made by the elected representatives.
However, it was not until 1988 that Korea officially ended the over 25 years of dictatorship by electing the President through direct voting system, and not until 1995 that Korea officially reestablished decentralized governance structure with local autonomy. In other words, average Korean citizens were deprived of the chances to exercise and experience the self-governance until very recently.
Since 1988, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of interest groups along with many social upheavals from labor unions with almost 3 ceremonial strikes each year. Moreover, it is becoming quite common to find rising conflicts in every corner of Korean society, especially between the government and groups of citizens who were the targets of government policies.
To make matters worse, due to the unique situation confronting the North Korea, there is a tremendous conflict of value dividing the citizens into pro-left and proright spectrum.
Many scholars and opinion-leaders find the lack of political leadership and immaturity of civil society as the underlying causes of such tremendous rise in social conflicts. And yet, it is quite difficult to accept such a causal relationship when considering the tremendous lack of experiences in selfgovernance of the Korean citizens themselves. To identify which are the causes and which are the symptoms, it becomes necessary to approach this question from a historical perspective. Namely, re-examining the modern Korean history from the perspective of accumulating collective experiences in self-governance becomes fundamental. This study attempts: first to identify the locus of democracy in Korea within the context of social development process, especially from the evolutionary perspective; second to distinguish between exogenous factors of democratic development that should be considered as 'given' and endogenous factors that should be considered as something that can be 'improved'; and third to propose that the improvement of democracy in Korea requires, besides anything else, a consensus building process on the fundamental values at the constitutional level of governance.
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Such a perspective requires a model that may explain the sequences of events that lead to major changes in social institutions, and this study will present such a model that the maturing of civil society depends on cumulative experiences of self-governance and subsequent learning effect from such 'collective experience,' which in turn must shape the institutional context of a society and the role expectation of actors and institutions. In short, cumulative collective experiences in self-governance of the average citizens are pre-requisite to maturing of civil society. This paper is organized as following: second chapter will discuss the locus of democracy in Korea focusing on the symptoms of democracy; third chapter will discuss the relationship between the 'collective experiences,' civil society, and social institutions (governance system); fourth chapter will discuss the endogenous and exogenous factors in the development of governance in Korea; and finally a consensus building process will be proposed as a policy solution to the current stage of governance in Korea.
II. Locus of Democracy in Korea
The history of Korea dates back to almost 5,000 years ago, and has evolved from tribal society to feudal age (Shilla and Korea Dynasty), and to a monarchy (Chosun Dynasty). Chosun Dynasty began in the year 1392 through a military coup by the General Lee Sungkye. The ruling group had chosen to 5 abandon the long-time feudal system of governance, and replaced it with a very strong central control by the King. To ensure the new governance structure of strong monarchy, Chosun Dynasty had emphasized the Confucianism replacing Buddhism.
Many principles of Confucianism emphasized the ethics of human behaviors and governance. For example, it emphasized an absolute obedience to the King, the elder, and the husband as well as the benevolent Kingship caring for its own people as its own offspring. The governing class as well as the governed subjects were to follow the practices of Confucianism through education, and kept its social order as such. Subsequently, the social classes were divided into the ruling class who are specialized in Confucianism principles, regular people, lower class, and slaves. There is a couple of points to be made from the above brief description of modern Korean history: still strong Confucianism principles of governance widely believed by the Korean citizens; lack of trust on the governing party stemming from the colonial experiences as well as the long-time dictatorship; strong valueconflict between socialism and capitalism, escalated by the experience of domestic warfare; lack of experience in self-governance of the average Korean citizens; and increasing demands by the average citizens for government to take actions. Thirdly, the conflict between two ideologies, socialism (and/or communism) and capitalism, has its root from the class system under the Chosun Dynasty. During the colonial period, communism spread quickly among the educated, and gained its momentum by promoting the idea of everyone getting equal share of everything. Of course, it is almost silly to talk about such since the communism has lost the battle with the end of the Cold War. However, the unique situation of two governments in the Korean peninsula, each based on different ideology, has influenced the perspectives of the Korean citizen greatly, and the battle continues even nowadays under different names: more equity in distribution vs. economic growth; employer vs. employee; haves vs. have-nots; chaebol vs. small-sized firms; etc.
The experience of the Korean War had more profound effect on such battles between ideologies because it had added personal emotions to the issues.
The domestic warfare among the people who considered themselves to be of one ethnic group, speaking same language, and shared same history and culture had created tremendous distrust in the Korean society. People had to survive through the war, and that meant classifying others either as a friend or as a foe. Anybody in the middle was considered to be a foe on both sides, and it limited the perspectives and cognitive perceptions of the citizen to see things as either black or white but no grays.
Fourthly, if one looks at the modern history of Korea, it becomes obvious that average citizens lack the important experiences of self-governance. The recent institutional changes towards decentralization is still not complete because the citizens do not have power to make policy decisions that may have direct consequences to their everyday lives, such as education, housing, health care, welfare, etc. Most of these functions are still under the control by the central government, and there is no local policy variation.
Furthermore, the local government officials have little experience in making policies themselves because all they needed to do was carrying out the central directives. This lack of experience in self-governance in terms of policy making and collective decision-making process seriously limits the capacity of grass root democracy.
Finally, the rise in sheer number of interest groups and the intensity of political activities of those interest groups as well as labor unions are interpreted as the signs of immature civil society. Their tendency to rely on physical forces to materialize their demands regardless of the justification on such demands has undermined the authority of the government. The two basic pillars of modern governance, the 'rule of law' and the majority principles of democracy, can no longer function properly.
In short, the average citizens of Korea are just beginning to accumulate experiences in self-governance: the true practice of grass-root democracy.
However, the soils of democracy are not so fertile to being with. The general perception of the citizens towards the authority is us-against-them, and there seems to be a lack of understanding on whether the average citizens can actually affect the policy decisions and if so how to influence such through due political process.
III. Collective Experience and Civil Society: a Model
From the historical perspectives, it can be said that the evolution of democratic society (maturing of civil society) requires social institutions that enables the practices of self-governance. However, judging from the Korean history, without proper understanding of such institutions may create further confusions in a society, even with the proper venues in places.
As a result, it is not so clear which causes the other: are such social institutions pre-requisite to maturing of civil society; or the maturing of civil society leads to changes in social institution that enables the practices of selfgovernance? In other words, what is the relationship between the social institutions and maturity of civil society? Before examining such relationship, it becomes necessary to discuss how the social institution gets developed. Social institution is a basic system of rules that enables people to live together in a society. Such rules are necessary to prevent the powerful to harm those without power at will: namely, to protect those without power. In other words, it is a system that prevents the rule by the tyranny, although it doesn't imply the practice of democracy.
Development of social institutions can be said to be path dependent that culture, value system, and histories of a society shape such social institutions.
Additionally, the perceptions of the people plays important role in shaping such institutions, and collective experiences of those people in a society shape such perceptions. The learning effect from such collective experiences, when accumulated enough to change the majority perception under democracy, will induce subsequent modifications of those social institutions.
Then, how do we define a 'collective experience?' Can any experiences that result in changing the existing perceptions or value systems of the people be defined as 'collective' experience? It may be defined as those experiences from a focusing event that may change the majority perceptions in a society. In a more formal way, the author defines the collective experience as following: any experience that involves more than two individuals can be called a 'group' experience, and any experience that involves more than two heterogeneous groups can be called a 'collective' experience.
Several hypotheses can be established according to above definition of 'collective' experience.
1. 'Collective' experience is created by a focal event in a society.
2. 'Collective' experience creates opportunities for a shared learning effect.
3. Shared learning effect will affect the existing perceptions and perspectives of the involved. 7. When such changes in social norms and values reach the majority, the actual systems/institutional changes will take place.
The implications of the 'collective' experience hypothesis is that, without a 'collective' experience, it is less likely that there would be any changes in social norms and values, and subsequently little changes in systems/institutions under democracy. Another implication is that if it is possible to facilitate such 'collective' experience, one may be able to affect the changes in systems/institutions regardless of its desirability. In other words, a group of people or the government itself may be able to induce institutional changes through simulating such 'collective' experiences by creating some focal events in a society.
Such does not necessarily imply a causal relationship between the 'collective' experience and maturity of civil society. However, if we define civility as accepting the rules and the practices of institutions without creating harms to other individuals in a society, and maturity of civil society as non-violent ways of expressing the interests and seeking ways to fulfill such interests through existing social institutions, then it may be said that such 'collective' experience and learning effect that enhances the understanding of civil manners and the functions of existing social institutions causes civil society to become more mature.
In other words, mature civil society would imply social institutions protecting individual freedom and rights, including property rights, and people in a society behave politely to each other through a code of conduct or institutions.
To be able to have such mature civil society, then understanding of the roles and expectations of actors in various segment of a society, such as government, media, interest groups, the President, and representatives, etc. becomes a necessary condition.
Then, in the context of the Korean society, where there is little understanding of the proper functions and roles of the government system as well as various social institutions due to lack of experiences in self-governance, the state of civil society is not a problem but a condition that should be taken as given.
However, having some consensus on basic social institutions and the system of governance would help the process of developing a mature civil society.
The process of developing the US Constitution may provide a good example of desirable relationships between development of social institutions (especially the governance structure), 'collective' experiences, and civil society. In terms of governance system, the recent trend shows a move from centralized government towards more decentralized government, from hierarchical way of implementation towards more network oriented one, from elite to coalitions, from top-down towards bottom-up, from ruling towards empowerments, and from rules and regulations towards participatory rule-making.
However, such changes in governance have its root in the 'collective' experiences of US citizens which have changed the majority perceptions and value systems of them, which in turn have changed the practices of governance.
IV. Factors in the Development of Governance in Korea
The most recurrent issues of governance in Korea during last two decades, to name a few, are: lack of political leadership and lack of vision; immaturity of civil society; misapplication of the rule of law; party politics based on factionalism and regionalism; lack of trust; government credibility, accountability, and consistency/predictability; concentrated decision-making power; relentless pursuit of group interest (especially the NIMBY); opportunism of public servants; and lack of agreed-upon procedure for collective decision-making.
To deal with such perceived problems, it is essential to have proper perspectives and analysis of the problems since how we perceive the problem would dictate the solution to such. As argued before, most of above problems stems from the lack experiences in self-governance, due to both transplanted government system as well as long dictatorship.
The transplanted government system without enough accumulation of experiences in self-governance limits the understanding of the governance system, which would create confusions of the proper roles that must be played by each political actor as defined in a Constitution. Coupled with 'king' like expectations on the President that exists in the current governance structure, each actor in the political process would behave as if they are under a monarchy, not as those in a representative democracy. The principle of rule of law would be undermined with concentrated decision-making power.
In addition, long periods of dictatorship have resulted in lack of experience in collective decision-making. There would also be lack of consensus / education on Constitution that people would perceive as the rules made by the dictator to prolong his power. Strong hierarchical perspectives and organizational culture will persist across every corner of a society, which would further undermine the everyday practices of democracy.
Furthermore, it can be argued that in any society, role of each political actor gets shaped through basic institutional structure as well as cumulative 'collective' experiences arising from power struggle between actors. Varying degree of successes and failures of the governance structure accumulates over time, which in turn defines the role of each political actor as well as the governance structure itself. Subsequently, desirable set of behaviors or code of conduct gets developed around the role of each actor. However, in the Korean context, the history of self-governance is too short to develop such role definitions.
Then, it becomes rather obvious that the three fundamental facts (transplanted government system, lack of role consensus, and lack of experiences in self-governance) have contributed to the current confusion over the proper role under the current constitution.
Looking at the above listed symptoms of governance from this perspective, there seems to be no easy solutions that could resolve the problems in a short-period of time: political actors have to go through power struggles; government has to re-establish its credibility through clear accountability and consistency; the principle of rule of law has to be reinforced; concentration of decision-making power has to be dissipated; citizens' understanding of the government institutions has to be increased; etc.
What is needed at the current stage of governance in Korea is a series of 'collective' experiences that would help shape people's perceptions in a desirable direction: maturing of civil society and practices of grass root democracy. Then, it is important to distinguish those factors that can be controlled in short-period of time and those factors that cannot be controlled but can be influenced over time. If 18 we can successfully identify those factors that can be controlled, then the government can put efforts to correct its path and hope for the best for the rest.
Conditions that require 'collective' experiences over long periods of time to provide solutions, and therefore have to be considered as given, are: lack of political leadership and party politics based on factionalism and regionalism; immaturity of civil society and lack of agreed upon code of conduct; relentless pursuit of group interest (NIMBY); and opportunism of public servants.
Political leadership and party politics does not change easily, and there seems to be no proper method that would guarantee the good quality of such politicians. Factionalism and regionalism are the fundamental characteristics of the Korean society, and there seems to be no easy way out because it is a part of the political culture. Almost all of these symptoms require some changes in people's perception for providing feasible solutions that may lead to changes in the behaviors. Naturally, there would be little short-term solutions available to address such. On the other hand, the government can focus its effort to reinforce the basic principles of governance and make constitutional changes to rearrange the power structure of the current governance system. In other words, the government should focus on reinforcing the rule of law and practices of democracy, protection of individual freedom and rights (including property rights), 20 make changes to the power structure by amending the Constitution, and increase the chances of practicing collective decision-making for the average citizens.
V. Proposing a Consensus Building Process
Even a minor change in the Constitution requires majority support of such changes in a society, and it is a not easy task when considering the existence of ideological conflict. Furthermore, any move to change the Constitution by the existing political parties or the government would face the suspicion of serving the interests of the political majority or the incumbent President under the current political culture of the Korea.
In terms of accumulating the 'collective' experience that must be a prerequisite to any changes in social institutions, as argued before, the process of changing the Constitution must involve some way of facilitating or simulating such 'collective' experiences that would change the general perceptions of the people as well as the social values. Even so, there is no guarantee that the result may contribute to the development of democracy and governance in a desirable direction.
Of course, there is no perfect governance system in anywhere, and the limitations of any governance system must be overcome by the actors in the system. And yet, there is no such role consensus established in the current Korean society. Korea is just beginning to accumulate the self-governance 21 experiences and the practices of true democracy, and the time it may take until it reaches the ripe situation to make Constitutional changes are unpredictable.
As argued before, having the right governance system is important in promoting the experiences of self-governance, and to have such system changes in Constitutions are needed.
Here lies the dilemma of the current Korean government because every problem are inter-locked with each other to certain extent, and any solution that deals one aspect of problem may result in creating another undesirable problems.
Henceforth, the utmost important thing in dealing with the current governance problem is going back to the principles and reinforcing such principles. The rule of law and the practice of democracy should be in place before anything else. Along with such government efforts, there must be a way of developing a consensus on the direction of Constitutional changes as well as the necessity of such changes at the current stages of social development of Korea.
In other words, there must be an open participatory process of collective decision-making: first to build consensus on the ideal state or future of the Korean society; second to enhance the understanding of governance philosophy among the average citizens, especially the principles of the rule of law and the majority decision-making; third to build a consensus on the proper role of government, especially in terms of how far the government should be responsible for private lives; and fourth to build consensus of the proper role for each political actor in the governance system.
In materializing such, the government could employ deliberative polling 22 technique, using the available communications technology. The whole process could proceed through different stages of polling. By creating two bodies of decision-making forum, one with specialists and the other with general public, and operating the deliberation of relevant issues and perspectives, the government can hope to have above mentioned effect on the citizens by simulating the 'collective' experience process which may result in changing perceptions and providing chances of education.
Small group discussions will be most effective for such purpose, and the necessary orientation and agenda setting process must be done before the initiation of the process. Decision procedure could resemble that of US Congress, and afterwards, there could be a public feed-back session on the decision made by the two forum. Throughout the process, the purpose is in educating the general public and building consensus on the future of Korea and amendments needed at the current stage of the development.
VI. Conclusion
At the current state of social development of Korea, it is necessary to enhance or re-establish the basic social institutions that are based upon a general consensus of the average citizens of Korea. The rule of law and the principles of democracy have to be reinforced, and constant efforts should be made to enhance the credibility of the government itself. Each actor in the political process must 23 realize the importance and necessity of such effort, and the Constitutional features that enhance the concentration of decision-making power must be revised.
Proper channels of input must be established for the common citizens through decentralized local government where the citizens can actually make policy decision for themselves.
To achieve such aim with a full consensus of the citizen, the author propose an open participatory process to build such consensus on the future direction of the Korean society, facilitating the 'collective' experiences that is necessary for social development, and provide chances of learning about the governance system, rather than waiting for the natural courses of development to take place over long periods of time.
